Revia

Why Revia

A practical approach to reviving the regional market.

A survey of the field: who is active, what programs have cost, and what that prices into the road ahead. The conclusion is the one the routes keep pointing to: no one else is building a conventional, clean-sheet aircraft in the 50–100 seat segment. That is the opening Revia is built for.

The field

The whole field, and the segment only Revia occupies.

Of nine active programs adjacent to the regional mission, two are airframe bets aimed at different markets, one is a 40-seat derivative, and six are propulsion bets. None combines conventional power, clean-sheet economics, and 50–100 seats: the segment the abandoned routes actually need.

Seats vs design range: the segment only Revia occupies05001,0001,5002,0002,5000255075100US scope clause: 76 seatsmedian mission ≈ 500 nm (est.)D328eco, 40 seats, 655 nmD328ecoAura ERA, 19 seats, 900 nm · electric / hybrid / new propulsionAura ERAElectra EL9, 9 seats, 1,100 nm · electric / hybrid / new propulsionElectra EL9Heart ES-30, 30 seats, 215 nm · electric / hybrid / new propulsionHeart ES-30TAC SY30J, 30 seats, 430 nmTAC SY30JTAC SY50J, 50 seats, 430 nmTAC SY50JElysian E9X, 92 seats, 470 nm · electric / hybrid / new propulsionElysian E9XEviation Alice, 9 seats, 250 nm · electric / hybrid / new propulsionEviation AliceMaeve MJ500, 88 seats, 800 nm · electric / hybrid / new propulsionMaeve MJ500SpaceJet M90, 88 seats, 2,040 nmSpaceJet M90728JET, 75 seats, 1,800 nm728JETATR 42-600, 48 seats, 720 nmATR 42-600ATR 42-500, 48 seats, 850 nmATR 42-500ATR 72-600, 72 seats, 740 nmATR 72-600ATR 72-500, 70 seats, 900 nmATR 72-500Q100, 37 seats, 1,020 nmQ100Q200, 39 seats, 1,300 nmQ200Q300, 50 seats, 920 nmQ300Q400, 78 seats, 1,100 nmQ400CRJ200, 50 seats, 1,700 nmCRJ200CRJ700, 70 seats, 1,400 nmCRJ700CRJ900, 76 seats, 1,550 nmCRJ900CRJ1000, 100 seats, 1,600 nmCRJ1000E175, 76 seats, 2,060 nmE175R-50, 50 seats, 1,150 nmR-50R-75, 76 seats, 900 nmR-75R-100, 100 seats, 700 nmR-100Design range (nm)Seats (baseline)
  • Revia Family
  • In development
  • On hold
  • No longer active
  • Legacy (in service)
  • Electric / hybrid / new propulsion

Baseline seats and design range; estimates included where programs have not published figures. Revia shown as a payload/range trade across one shared wing. Green rings mark the electric, hybrid, and new-propulsion programs.

Attrition

Two eras of attrition, and the lessons repeat.

In this segment, the constraint has rarely been demand. It has been capital, certification execution, or geopolitics. Propulsion-focused programs face physics on top of funding. Incumbents have largely stayed out: ATR’s EVO decision keeps slipping, Embraer shelved its next-gen turboprop, and the E175-E2 remains scope-constrained in the US.

Conventional era: constrained by capital & execution

  1. 1996Fokker

    Ended during production

  2. 2001BAe Avro RJX

    Wound down shortly after first flight

  3. 2002Fairchild Dornier 728

    Ended mid-program

  4. 2023Mitsubishi SpaceJet

    ≈$10B invested; ended before certification

Propulsion era: limited by physics & funding

  1. 2019Zunum Aero

    Boeing-backed hybrid; wound down

  2. 2023Tecnam P-Volt

    Suspended: battery economics

  3. 2024Universal Hydrogen

    ≈$100M; operations wound down

  4. 2025Eviation Alice

    ≈$200M; on hold after first flight

  5. 2026Maeve

    Wound down in 2026

Propulsion-focused programs keep exiting on physics and funding: the pattern the failure-mode analysis anticipated.

Who’s still in play

The active field puts the timeline in context. Every program still moving is a different-market airframe, a sub-50-seat derivative, or a new-propulsion bet. None combines conventional power, clean-sheet economics, and 50–100 seats.

  • JetZero · Z4 blended-wing-body

    ~200+ seats
    Airframe bet

    Demonstrator in build with USAF backing: a large, different-market airframe, not a 50–100 seat regional.

  • Deutsche Aircraft · D328eco

    40 seats
    Derivative

    A re-engined Do 328 successor: conventional power, but below the 50-seat floor.

  • The AirCraft Co. · SY30J / SY50J

    30 / 50 seats
    Clean-sheet, early-stage

    Conventional regional jets in early, lightly funded development.

  • Aura Aero · ERA

    19 seats
    New propulsion

    Hybrid-electric 19-seater; first flight now targeted for late 2027.

  • Electra · EL9

    9 seats
    New propulsion

    Hybrid-electric STOL aimed at an adjacent short-field market.

  • Heart Aerospace · ES-30

    30 seats
    New propulsion

    Hybrid-electric 30-seater at the ground-demonstrator stage.

  • Elysian · E9X

    90 seats
    New propulsion

    Battery-electric concept from a research-led team; pre-prototype.

The incumbents

The players who owned this segment have moved away from it.

The 50–100 seat segment was once well served. One by one, the incumbents that built it have exited, moved upmarket, or let their airframes age without a successor. That is what leaves the segment unserved today.

  • ATR

    ATR 42 / 72 · 48–72 seats

    In service, no successor

    The airframe dates to the 1980s and tops out at 72 seats. The clean-sheet “EVO” launch decision keeps slipping, and there is no 90–100 seat product on the roadmap.

  • Embraer

    E175 / E175-E2 · 76–88 seats

    Upmarket + scope-constrained

    The re-engined E175-E2 came in too heavy for the US scope clause and has drawn no US orders. Embraer shelved its next-gen turboprop and focuses on the larger 150-seat E2 jets.

  • Bombardier

    CRJ family · 50–100 seats

    Exited commercial

    Sold the CRJ program to Mitsubishi (2020) and the CSeries to Airbus, where it became the larger 100–150 seat A220. Bombardier left regional aviation for business jets.

  • De Havilland Canada

    Dash 8-400 · 78–90 seats

    Production paused

    Paused Dash 8 production and shifted focus; no active 50–100 seat line, with any restart years out.

Capital vs progress

What the field’s capital has produced.

Billions have flowed into this problem. Most of it has produced prototypes and demonstrators rather than certified aircraft. A clean-sheet Part 25 family is a multi-billion-dollar, multi-round program, and that reality is what the timeline above reflects.

Mitsubishi SpaceJet~$10B

Six flying prototypes; program ended in 2023 without reaching certification

JetZero>$1B

Demonstrator in build, first flight targeted 2027 (incl. $235M USAF + commitments)

Aura Aero (ERA)€340M

First flight now targeted for late 2027 (incl. ≈€290M subsidies / state)

Electra (EL9)~$235M

Part 23 application filed; 2,200 pre-orders, an adjacent market

Eviation (Alice)~$200M

One flight in 2022; development on hold since early 2025

Heart (ES-30)~$145M

Ground-demonstrator stage; restructured and relocated

Universal Hydrogen~$100M

Testbed flew in 2023; operations wound down in 2024

Maeve (MJ500)~€30M

Concept through several redesigns; wound down in 2026 (est.)

The AirCraft Co.~$8M

Simulator + sub-scale prep (self / angel funded, est.)

  • Active: funded
  • Constrained / early-stage
  • Exited / on hold
  • Bar length on a log scale ($10M → $10B)

What getting to EIS has cost

  • Bombardier CSeries: clean-sheet, certified

    ≈ $6B to EIS: a company-defining investment

  • Embraer E2: derivative, certified

    ≈ $1.7B. The derivative discount is real

  • Mitsubishi SpaceJet: clean-sheet

    ≈ $10B, and never reached certification

  • JetZero: clean-sheet, in progress

    >$1B raised + committed: buys a demonstrator, not an EIS

Revia ties capital to proof: each round priced against delivered artifacts, with defense and cargo variants carrying clean-sheet engineering first.

The approach

A platform that ships now, and takes on new propulsion when it’s ready.

The failures above repeat one lesson: programs that bet a clean-sheet airframe and an unproven powertrain at once take on two integration risks together, and the second one keeps carrying them out before service. Revia separates the two. We fly a conventional aircraft on next-generation engines first, certifiable, efficient, and in service, and prove the airframe and the business case before adding anything experimental.

That is not a bet against electric, hybrid, or alternative propulsion. It is how we earn the right to fly them: one wing, one cross-section, and one engine interface, engineered as a stable platform to adopt new powertrains as they mature.

01

Ship a proven aircraft

A conventional family on next-generation engines: certifiable, efficient, and in service, not a demonstrator.

02

De-risk the integration

Prove the airframe and the business case first, separately from any new powertrain: the failure mode that has grounded the field.

03

Upgrade when it's ready

One shared architecture, built to take on electric, hybrid, and alternative propulsion as the technology matures.

What the census says

01

The 50–100 seat segment has sat unserved since 2002.

No conventional clean-sheet has served this segment since Fairchild Dornier wound down, and the most recent exit in 2026 left it unserved once more.

02

Capital follows propulsion stories in. Physics tends to carry it back out.

Several propulsion-focused programs have exited in the past three years. The programs still moving are derivatives, sub-19-seaters, or airframe bets with conventional engines, which points back toward a conventional-power thesis.

03

The demand signal is proven, and currently unmet.

SkyWest took equity and launch rights in this segment. Delta partnered on it. United funds adjacent clean-sheets. That demand is still waiting for an aircraft that closes the business case.

Same diagnosis as the field. A different approach. Revia.

The regional family →Get in touch

All figures drawn from public sources as of June 2026; estimates are marked (est.). Capital includes disclosed subsidies and government contracts where noted.